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Abstract
Deception is a frequent component o f daily conversation and interactions. It is
used both casually and deliberately in low and high stakes situations, respectively. A
need to develop more accurate and efficient deception detection techniques has
become important in response to such high stakes situations in which deliberate
deception is employed. Terrorist acts motivated by fanatical beliefs constitute perhaps
the most salient and increasingly prevalent example o f such high stakes deception.
Fanaticism develops in response to a number o f belief systems including religion,
politics, and sports. The relative accessibility and social acceptability o f sports
fanaticism lends itself to experimental investigation and provides a theoretical model
to begin to understand deception in fanatical individuals.
The currents study uses sports fan affiliation as a model o f fanaticism and
seeks to determine the hemispheric differences that exist during deceptive and
truthful statements. High and low affiliation fans were shown images o f their favorite
team, team rival, and a control stimulus and instructed to indicate their preferred team
either deceptively or truthfully. By employing Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation
(TMS) during such statements, a measure o f hemispheric activation was obtained
relevant to the peak, area under the curve, and variability o f the motor evoked
potential generated.
Contrary to what was expected, it was found that the left hemisphere
displayed greater activation and that high affiliation sports fans evidenced less
activation during both true and deceptive statements. The theoretical implications are
discussed along with possible explanations for the results.
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Introduction
Deception is a normal aspect o f social interaction and occurs quite commonly
in everyday communication and in personal reflections. There are instances o f
deception, however, which facilitate and ultimately result in violent and illegal acts.
Fanatical individuals who are acting upon an ideological agenda to promote their
beliefs will often resort to terrorist acts (Taylor & Ryan, 1988) that rely, in part, on
deceptive and covert behaviors. Growing safety and security concerns resulting from
such acts have resulted in a need for better deception detection mechanisms and a
paradigm through which one can approach an understanding o f fanatical individuals
and beliefs.
Tactical deception is defined as the intentional misrepresentation or
manipulation o f something as true or valid, which the individual who is deceiving
knows to be false or invalid. Further, withholding information that is known to be true
and valid is also considered to be a deceptive act (Byrne & Whiten, 1985). The
pervasive nature o f deceptive acts suggests that there may be a universal inclination
to engage in such acts and that there may, in fact, be adaptive benefits associated with
deception. The cognitive complexity involved in deception indicates that this is a
highly advanced higher order process that relies on a number o f other cognitive
processes that require a depth o f understanding o f the self, others, and the world at
large (Spence et al., 2001).
Children 21/2-years-old are capable o f using basic deceptive strategies. The
earliest strategies employed are often directed at communicating false beliefs
designed to mislead others. Task specific strategies include withholding evidence,
destroying evidence, and overt lying (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Sodian, Taylor,

Deception and Sports Fanaticism

7

Harris, & Pemer, 1991). There is some evidence, however, to suggest that a
comprehensive understanding o f these actions and their effects is not present at this
young age (Sodian, Taylor, Harris, & Perner, 1991) but others maintain that young
children are capable o f understanding and directing these actions (Lewis, Sullivan,
Stanger, & Weiss, 1989). At the age o f five, most children are rapidly becoming
capable and proficient deceivers and are beginning to fully understand false beliefs,
as language continues to develop and social interactions increase (Ritblatt, 2000;
Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003).
Evolutionists seek to explain the early onset and cognitive complexity
characteristic o f deception through an understanding o f the adaptive benefits
associated with deception. In doing so, primatologists look to the behavior and
communication between non-human primates in an attempt to provide insight into
whether or not deceptive acts are uniquely humans or if they are found in human
evolutionary ancestors. In conjunction with childhood deception research, the early
literature is devoted to an understanding o f false communication signals in the animal
world and the theorized intention o f the individual communicating the false signal as
well as the cost-benefit analysis o f engaging in such behavior (Gouzoules &
Gouzoules, 2002). If the signaler gains from a receiver’s acceptance o f a false signal,
deception is said to have occurred. As stated, however, there is a cost-benefit tradeoff
that must be considered. While access to resources may be obtained through
deception, recognition by the rest o f the population o f the individual as a deceiver
may cost the individual in reputation and social connectedness (Wiley, 1994 as cited
in Gouzoules & Gouzoules, 2002).
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Specific examples o f these deceptive signals have been documented in support
o f the notion that competition to secure resources including food, shelter, and mates is
often accomplished through misguiding others or the withholding o f information
(Goodall, 1986). Chimpanzees evidence general deceptive behavior including
feigning injury, signaling reconciliation in order to facilitate an attack, and
withholding information regarding food location (de Waal, 1998). However, the
complexity o f these behaviors and the deceptive strategies implemented lack the
sophistication evidenced by human primates.
Experimental evidence supporting the notion that non-human primates engage
in deliberate deception has been presented using techniques in which the intention o f
the sender and receiver or information alternates between cooperative and
competitive. Deceptive pointing to and withholding o f relevant information were
examined in capuchin monkeys in cooperative and competitive tasks. It was found
that the animals behaved deceptively, at a level comparable to that o f 4-year-old
children (Mitchell & Anderson, 1997). Additionally, Chimpanzees have been shown
to provide false information and to withhold information when in competition with
another. In conjunction with this, receiver chimpanzees were able to discount and
exhibit skepticism when the sender’s intentions were not genuine but were instead
guided by competition (W oodruff & Premack, 1979). Certainly, deception is not
unique to humans, but is rather, evidenced by these non-human primates and
suggestive o f the cost-benefit adaptive strategies that may have shaped the
development o f deceptive abilities in early human ancestors.
The development o f deception is closely related to the existence o f other
higher order cognitive abilities (Keenan, Gallup, & Falk, 2003). It is theorized that in
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order to be deceptive, an individual must have an understanding o f self as well as an
understanding o f others. Individuals who are able to successfully deceive are able to
recognize what they themselves might believe in a given situation and use that
knowledge to effectively deceive others. Self-awareness, therefore, is an essential
component in this sequence o f cognitive events (Keenan, Gallup, & Falk, 2003).
Self-awareness is defined as a chronic or situation-specific self-directed
attention or thought that renders an individual conscious o f and able to reflect upon
his or her own existence, thoughts, and individuality (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss,
1975). The original and most conclusive measure o f self-awareness is dependent upon
self-recognition. The mirror recognition task has been shown to successfully
differentiate those individuals who can recognize their reflection from those who
cannot (Gallup, 1998). It is argued that this task is an effective, nonverbal measure o f
self-awareness. The task begins, following baseline mirror exposure, with the covert
application o f a mark to the face o f an individual. Mark-directed movements made in
front o f the mirror are believed to indicate that the individual is aware that the
reflection is his or her own and, therefore, that the mark that is present in the
reflection is also present on his or her face (Gallup, 1998). In conjunction with the
evidence supporting deceptive acts, chimpanzees, orangutans, and humans are the
only animals that have definitively passed the mirror recognition task (Gallup, 1998;
de Veer, Gallup, & Theall, 2003).
Children successfully pass the mirror recognition task at approximately age 2
(Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989). As noted, this corresponds with the
earliest onset o f deceptive behaviors (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989). The
development o f self-conscious emotions and personal pronoun use occur at this age as
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well (Lewis & Ramsay, 2004; Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger & Weiss, 1989). The ability
to internalize and exhibit self conscious emotions including embarrassment, envy,
pride, and shame, relies on an understanding o f ones’ self and self referential
behavior and therefore, coincides with the development o f self-awareness (Lewis,
Sullivan, Stanger & Weiss, 1989). Personal pronoun use requires a similar cognitive
understanding reflected in the child’s ability to construct a metarepresentation o f the
self as reflected in the newly acquired language skill (Lewis & Ramsay, 2004).
The neural correlates o f self-awareness have been investigated using a variety
o f populations and techniques. Callosotomy patients provide a unique window
through which hemispheric differences in self-recognition ability can be viewed. Also
known as split-brain patients, these individuals have had the corpus callosum, which
connects the right and left hemispheres, severed, often to alleviate seizures caused by
intractable epilepsy. In working with this population, Roger Sperry (1979) is credited
with the discovery that the right hemisphere, previously thought o f as the minor
hemisphere, is capable o f self-recognition and strong emotional responses to the self
face. Earlier evidence was suggestive o f this as it was reported that presenting the
self-face to such patients resulted in an increased physiological response as measured
by skin resistance (Preilowski, 1977). More recent evidence provides additional
support for the notion o f right hemisphere dominance in self-face processing. The
WADA test, a procedure involving independently anesthetizing the hemispheres prior
to surgical procedures, provides another instance o f testing independent hemispheric
function. Morphed self-faces and famous faces presented to a group o f individuals
undergoing the WADA test indicated a right hemisphere self-face processing
dominance. When presented with a morphed image, the right hemisphere self
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identified while the left hemisphere did not (Keenan, Nelson, O ’Connor, & PascualLeone, 2001). In conjunction, the same task presented to a split-brain patient
indicated increased response accuracy and decreased false positive self-identifications
in the right hemisphere (Keenan, Wheeler, Platek, Lardi, & Lassonde, 2003).
Neuroimaging studies have significantly contributed to the current body o f
knowledge concerning self-awareness. Investigating passive and active self-face
recognition using Positron Emission Technology (PET) resulted in a number o f
activated areas in both the left and right hemispheres. During passive viewing o f the
self-face, designed to eliminate the effects o f attentional states, activation o f the right
frontal cortex and right supramarginal were observed (Sugiura.et al., 2000).
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (1MRI) has been performed using self-face
viewing tasks. Blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) activity during such tasks has
supported the notion o f right hemisphere lateralized activation. Specifically, the right
middle and superior frontal gyri were activated during self-face viewing in
comparison with famous faces (Platek, Keenan, Gallup, & Mohamed, 2004).
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) has also been used in self-face
recognition tasks (Keenan, Nelson, O’Connor, & Pascual-Leone, 2001). The
magnetic field generated by TMS can be applied to the motor cortex o f the left and
right hemispheres individually. Measuring the amplitude o f the motor-evoked
potential generated by the stimulation serves as an indicator o f hemispheric activation
during the task. Using this technique during morphed self-face viewing has indicated
that morphed pictures containing more self-elements result in greater right
hemisphere activation (Keenan, Nelson, O ’Connor, & Pascual-Leone, 2001).
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The relationship between self-awareness and deception has been documented
beyond the theoretical connections that have been posited. The ability to accurately
detect deception has been significantly correlated with self-awareness. Based on the
notion that those individuals who have a heightened sense o f their own being and
insight into their own cognitions will have a similar insight into the thoughts o f
others, deception detection should improve as measures o f self-awareness reflect
increased levels. This has been found to be the case, specifically, in females detecting
deception in potential mates (Johnson et al., 2004).
As stated, beyond self-awareness, an understanding o f others is required for
successful deception. Theory o f Mind (TOM) is best understood as the ability to
understand and interpret the mental states o f others. Self-awareness is believed to be a
necessary and antecedent cognitive ability for the development o f mental state
attribution, or TOM (Gallup, 1998). It is likely, therefore, that there is a distinct
relationship between individuals who exhibit self-awareness and those who can
model the mental states o f others.
The social intelligence and perspective taking abilities that exemplify TOM
begin to emerge at around the age o f 2. While these young children are prone to error
and do not exhibit the expertise characteristic o f fully cognitively developed
individuals, their approximately synchronous emergence is supportive o f the
theoretical connectedness o f self-awareness and TOM (Gallup, 1998). Conclusive
support for the notion o f a complex understanding o f TOM has been documented in
children at age 4 (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1994) and has been shown to be correlated
with deceptive ability (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Ritblatt, 2000). Chimpanzees
and orangutans, which have been shown to exhibit self-awareness, have also
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demonstrated a rudimentary TOM ability. They have exhibited problem solving
abilities and task specific responses consistent with accurate modeling o f the mental
states o f others (de Waal, 1998; Premack & Woodruff, 1978).
The nature o f the relationship between self-awareness and TOM suggests that
they likely share similar neurological underpinnings. Extensive and complex TOM
tasks have been tested using fMRI. Cooperation in instances o f reciprocal social
exchange requires TOM abilities in order to ensure that the participating individuals
have an understanding o f mutual goals and mutual expectations (McCabe, Houser,
Ryan, Smith, & Trouard, 2001). The prefrontal cortex was shown to be active during
cooperative tasks involving a human partner, above and beyond those areas activated
during a similar task using a computer counterpart, absent o f intention and
cooperation. Findings o f prefrontal activation in TOM tasks are indicative o f higher
order processing and support the notion that such cognitive abilities are highly
advanced (McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith, & Trouard, 2001).
The right hemisphere activation shown in self-awareness has also been
demonstrated in TOM tasks. Event-related Potentials (ERP) indicates that during the
mind in the eyes task, a technique that is used to determine an individual’s ability to
understand another’s mental state based on the information conveyed by facial
expressions, activates the inferior frontal and anterior temporal regions o f the right
hemisphere (Sabbagh, Moulson, & Harkness, 2004). Further, regional cerebral blood
flow measured during a PET scan o f individuals tasked with interpreting the
intentions o f characters portrayed in a comic strip, lends support to the theory
outlined above. In addition to an overarching complex cognitive network, the right
medial prefrontal cortex was significantly implicated in the attribution task. It is
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suggested that the laterality o f this function is related to a general laterality o f TOM
(Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, & Decety, 2000).
A number o f fMRI studies have supported and extended the results outlined
above. For instance, individuals asked to read a number o f short stories requiring the
use o f TOM and/or self-relevant judgments exhibited a particular BOLD pattern o f
activation. The self and TOM stories elicited both shared and unique neural
mechanisms. The unique interaction between the two was situated in the right
prefrontal cortex (Vogeley et al., 2001). Relying, in part, on shared mechanisms
further underscores the theoretical connectedness o f self and theory o f mind and
suggests that cognitive processes, such as deception, that rely on an interaction o f the
two, are in fact related.
Clinical evidence lends support to the neuroimaging results suggestive o f right
hemisphere dominance in TOM tasks. Evidence o f deficits has been found in patients
suffering right hemisphere damage using similar tasks including the presentation o f
short stories and cartoon strips requiring the individual to rely on theory o f mind
abilities to decipher intent and the attribution o f mental states to the characters
represented in the stories. Individuals who have suffered right hemisphere stroke
damage have been shown to evidence difficulty with these tasks, specifically with
instances o f understanding false beliefs and inference strategies (Happe, Brownell,
Winner, 1999).
In accordance with self-conscious emotions, including guilt and pride, the
development o f empathy is tied to self-awareness, but more importantly to theory o f
mind and the ability to reflect upon the thoughts and experiences o f others (Gallup,
1998). Deficits in empathy are present in some individuals who have suffered brain
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damage. Specifically, individuals who have suffered damage to the right ventromedial
cortex exhibit deficits in empathy and general perspective taking. Additionally, right
prefrontal cortex damage contributes to a lack o f understanding o f social faux pas
tasks (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, & Aharon-Peretz, 2003).
Two o f the pervasive developmental disorders, Autism and Asperger’s
syndrome, though differing in specific diagnostic criteria, share a deficit in social
intelligence and performance problems on tasks involving modeling the mental
attributes o f others. There is some evidence to support the notion that right
hemisphere dysfunction is, at least in part, responsible for the social deficiencies
exhibited by individuals with pervasive developmental disorders (Ellis & Gunter,
1999).
The body o f knowledge in existence for the relationship between selfawareness and Theory o f Mind and the evidence in support o f predominantly right
hemisphere activation in tasks involving both is suggestive o f possible right
hemisphere dominance in deception, involving both the detection and generation o f
deceptive thoughts and statements. Evidence indicating the possible anatomical
correlates o f deception has been gathered in clinical populations, behavioral tasks,
and neuroimaging studies involving deception.
A hemispheric asymmetry has been reported in deception detection (Malcolm
& Keenan, 2005). Specifically, a left ear, right hemisphere, advantage for the ability
to accurately categorize deceptive and truthful statements has been found. True and
false statements presented monaurally are more likely to be accurately recognized as
truthful or deceptive when played to the left ear (Malcolm & Keenan, 2005).
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The ability to detect deception has been studied in patients with brain damage.
Distinguishing lies from jokes involves the capacity to infer the mental states o f
others and evaluate discourse interpretation. For example, distinguishing the fact that
a liar inappropriately expects his audience to believe what is said whereas a joker
appropriately expects that his audience will not believe what is said. Individuals who
have suffered right hemisphere damage exhibit significant impairments in tasks
dependent upon understanding second-order expectations and belief patterns (Winner,
Brownell, Happe, Blum & Pincus, 1998).
A common paradigm used in deception detection tasks, in both humans and
non-human primates, involves inference o f deceptive intention. An example o f such a
task involves identifying the location o f concealed items such as coin pieces. While
the object is hidden, the participant’s view is obscured, ensuring that the individual
must rely upon the assistance o f an outside party who did observe the hiding process.
The outside party consistently provides deceptive answers to the participant as to the
location o f the object. The participant’s ability to infer the deceptive intent o f the
outside party is reflected in the participant’s choice o f a hidden location other than
that reported by the outside party (Stuss, Gallup, & Alexander, 2001). In individuals
with brain damage, lesions in the medial frontal cortex, particularly right ventral,
impaired performance on this task, indicating a deficit in deception detection and
mental state attribution (Stuss, Gallup, & Alexander, 2001).
In addition to deception detection, the generation o f deceptive statements and
the withholding o f truthful statements have been evaluated for neurological origin.
Data obtained using fMRI have indicated a general activation in bilateral ventrolateral
prefrontal cortices and anterior cingulate during tasks requiring individuals to lie
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about recent episodic memories (Spence et al., 2004; Spence et al., 2001). In
comparison with truthful statements, the executive brain regions shown to be active
during deceptive tasks are suggestive o f intention. The act o f deceiving requires a
purposeful or intentional act dependent upon executive control (Spence et al., 2004).
Additional research with fMRI has been conducted using a money location
task similar to the one outline above. In contrast with the previous study, however,
scanning was performed on the individuals generating deceptive versus truthful
answers regarding money location. Activation was found in the orbitofrontal, right
middle frontal, cortex and the anterior cingulate during deceptive responses (Kozel et
al., 2004; Kozel, Padgett, & George, 2004). It is suggested that response inhibition
plays a distinct role in deception tasks as deception requires a deliberate inhibition o f
a truthful response, and as such, may activate the related areas mentioned above
(Kozel et al., 2004; Spence et al, 2001).
Additional evidence supportive o f the role o f the right hemisphere in
deception has been presented from an individual patient suffering from pathological
lying. At the time o f treatment, the pathological lying exhibited by the patient was
reported as ranging from trivial to serious matters and o f unknown origin. SPECT
brain scanning indicated that the origin o f the disorder lay in the right hemithalamic
dysfunction evidenced by a significant reduction in blood flow that likely reflected
the impaired functioning (Modell, Mountz, & Ford, 1992).
Finally, a recent study combining TMS and deception has demonstrated
increased cortical excitability associated with deceptive statements (Lo, Fook-Chong,
& Tan, 2003). Evaluating the excitability o f the motor cortex during a deception task
by measuring motor evoked potentials (MEP) during the administration o f TMS
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serves as a nonverbal measure o f deceptive behavior. It was found that both simple
and complex lies generated increased cortical activity (Lo, Fook-Chong, & Tan,
2003).
Following the acknowledgement that deception is a frequent component o f
human behavior that is capable o f being studied and correlated with other cognitive
functions, it is important to determine what other variables contribute to, enhance or
generally affect deception. For instance, statements that are inconsistent with an
individual’s viewpoint have been shown to result in a variety o f verbal and nonverbal
behavioral markers that identify the statement as conflicting with the individual’s true
beliefs (Wagner & Pease, 1973). Does the individual’s perceived level o f conflict
with the deceptive statement extend beyond behavioral implications and affect the
neurological facets o f deception? Would strongly held beliefs induce a conflict
sufficient to require a differential amount or pattern o f activation necessary to
generate the deceptive statement?
Many individuals identify themselves with a variety o f organized groups and
belief systems that result in persistent and intense likes and dislikes. The benefits o f
group affiliation include enhancing self-esteem, creating a sense o f purpose, and
fostering a sense o f belonging (Mael & Ashforth, 2001). However, a more
detrimental characteristic o f group or ideological association is the potential that the
psychological commitment will become overwhelming (Mael & Ashforth, 2001).
Fanaticism is defined as a belief or behavior marked by excessive enthusiasm and
intense devotion. Broadly understood as a specific form o f social identification,
fanaticism is sometimes present in individuals who consider themselves members or
devotees o f explicit groups and or ideologies including: patriotism/nationalism,
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religion, politics, and sports (Mael & Ashforth, 2001; Greene, 2004). Individuals who
become fanatical tend to exhibit a shift in thought and motivation such that the
collective begins to supersede the individual (Taylor & Ryan, 1988).
Sport spectatorship carries with it a number o f specific attributes that vary
according to the level o f affiliation that the individual exhibits toward the sports
organization. The characteristics that distinguish casual fandom from sports
fanaticism have been quantified using a variety o f measurement techniques in
conjunction with theoretical observations seeking to account for the social and
psychological benefits associated with such affiliation (Mahony, Madrigal, &
Howard, 2000; Wann & Branscombe, 1993). Establishing the existence o f a
psychological profile o f highly identified sports fans requires differentiation o f the
levels o f commitment to the sports team and the resultant behavioral corollaries.
Among the measurement techniques that exist, the Sports Spectator
Identification Scale (SSIS) has played a decidedly prominent role within the relevant
literature in the establishment o f a deeper understanding o f levels o f sports fandom
(Wann & Branscombe, 1993). Using a Likert scale format, an individual’s level o f
identification with a specific sports team is measured. For example, statements such
as, “How important to YOU is it that your favorite baseball team wins?” and “How
much do YOU dislike your favorite baseball team’s rivals?” are used to address the
varying levels o f sports identification. In addition, the statements that appear on the
scale are designed to address behavioral differences between the highly identified fan
and the casual sports observer. By rating the frequency o f fan specific behaviors
including displaying the team insignia and actively following the preferred team’s
performance, a measurement o f team identification is obtained. Specifically, the SSIS
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has been shown to be internally consistent with a Cronbach reliability coefficient o f
.91 and a factor analysis has demonstrated that a single factor accounting for 66.3%
o f the variance can be claimed (Wann & Branscombe, 1993).
Another scale that is in use addresses team loyalty by again measuring
attitudinal and behavioral components o f sports identification. The Psychological
Commitment to Team (PCT) uses a Likert-scale to measure the degree to which the
individual is committed to their preferred team (Mahony, Madrigal, & Howard,
2000). Statements that appear on the scale include, “I might rethink my allegiance to
my favorite team if this team consistently performs poorly” and “I could never switch
my loyalty from my favorite team even if my close friends were fans o f another
team”. Construct and predictive validity have been confirmed in addition to a
Cronbach reliability coefficient o f .88 (Mahony, Madrigal, & Howard, 2000).
Beyond the attitudinal and behavioral aspects o f sports fandom, information
on the underlying motivation for sports spectatorship has been addressed.
Differentiating between such motivations as financial gain and enhanced self-esteem
further contributes to a deeper understanding o f the sports fan (Wann, Schrader, &
Wilson, 1999). Finally, factual knowledge about the specific team and knowledge
about the sport in general vary predictably according to level o f sports identification.
For this reason, questionnaires requiring thorough knowledge o f the team are often
used to supplement the aforementioned scales (Wann & Branscombe, 1995). The
quantitative measures outlined above provide a way to delineate, in the most extreme
cases, the indifferent, non-affiliated spectator from the fanatic.
Fanaticism directed towards a sports team, along with fanaticism in general, is
a compelling force in an individual’s life. The cognitive development and
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socialization necessary for team preference and team loyalty have been shown to exist
as early as age five (Jeffrey, 2001). Young children who exhibit team loyalty display
a certain level o f cognitive complexity that renders their team affiliation resistant to
change. Rationales given for team preference demonstrating this complexity include
team success, geographic proximity, and personal association with the team. The
socialization o f team identification and loyalty is explained, in part, as a function o f
learned behavior with fathers identified as the most salient influence and with
significantly more boys than girls demonstrating team preference and loyalty (Jeffrey,

2001).
Although, for some individuals, team loyalty develops at a later age, the
intense devotion to the team is usually unwavering and generative o f a number o f
behavioral and psychological manifestations (Jeffrey, 2001; Markman & Hirt, 2002).
For example, an allegiance bias often accompanies high levels o f team loyalty.
Individuals who are highly psychologically invested in the success o f their preferred
team will tend to provide biased predictions about game outcome and biased recall o f
game-specific events. These biased predictions are most evident in game scenarios
involving the preferred team and that team’s rivals. It is suggested that fans rely on a
biased memory strategy that is supportive o f the desired team victory, even after a fan
is presented with evidence in support o f a different, less favorable outcome
(Markman & Hirt, 2002).
Understanding the origins o f sports related fanaticism warrants an analysis o f
those impetuses that have been identified as motivators for engaging in such fandom.
Economics, escape, aesthetics, eustress, group affiliation, family, and entertainment
have been found to be important contributors to the individual’s interest in sports and
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the extent o f their team loyalty (Wann, Schrader, & Wilson, 1999). The behavioral,
emotional, and social derivatives o f sports fanaticism are, in part, influenced by the
specific motivation. As such, these motivational forces direct the origin o f the
individual’s drive and their existence warrants further explication.
An evaluation o f overzealous team affiliation must extend beyond the
motivators discussed above. Social Identity Theory, as put forth by Tajfel and Turner
(1986), posits that an individual possesses a self-concept comprised o f an individual
identity and a collective identity (as cited in Mael & Ashforth, 2001). Accordingly,
team identification bestows psychological costs and benefits on the individual based
on an individual and a collective identity, respectively. Variations in self-esteem, a
sense o f belonging, transcendence o f the self, and aspirations are all considered to be
a direct outcome o f fan identification dependent upon and varying in accordance with
team successes and failures (Mael & Ashforth, 2001). Evidence suggests that
successful game outcome predicts a fan’s estimate o f the team’s future success and
the fan’s future success in sport irrelevant tasks. Specifically, individuals who are
highly identified with a sports team will estimate their own potential for success in
the upcoming task relative to the failure or success o f their team. In accordance,
measurable changes in self-esteem accompany the team loss or win and have been
shown to mediate the projective performance estimates (Hirt, Zillman, Erickson, &
Kennedy, 1992). As a result, the impact o f team failure on the individual’s self-worth,
leads fans to be more likely to identify with successful teams. A refection o f this
tendency is exemplified by the phenomenon o f “Basking in the Reflected Glory”
(End, Dietz-Uhler, Harrick, & Jacquemotte, 2002). In order to bask in the glory o f
success, sports fans use phrases including “we” and “our” when discussing team
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victories and are more likely to wear team apparel following team victory, but not
loss (Cialdini, 1976). As such, taking ownership o f the team success by basking in the
glory bolsters the individual self-concept (End, Dietz-Uhler, Harrick, & Jacquemotte,

2002).
The creation o f a sports fan identity is both an individual and a collective
experience. Team loyalty imbues a sense o f community and solidarity through the
creation o f an interpersonal network o f social connections that formulate a certain
level o f identity in relation to the other members o f the group (Jacobson, 2003).
Beyond the collective aspect o f sports fandom addressed in social identity theory, it is
argued that identity theory must turn to the individual aspect o f fandom. That is to
say, understanding how sports fandom impacts the individual’s self-concept outside
o f the collective or group identity (Jacobson, 2003). For instance, highly affiliated
sports fans internalize the sport fan aspect o f their self-concept such that mentioning
fandom in a self-description is highly correlated with level o f sports identification. In
addition, self-esteem is an accurate predictor o f the timing o f fandom disclosure
during self-description, with those exhibiting higher self esteem revealing fandom at
an earlier point in the self-description (Wann, Royalty, & Roberts, 2000). It is
interesting to note that the self-description was provided to rival fans and as such
establishes a specific dyadic interaction that is complicated by feelings o f animosity
and competition (Wann, Royalty, & Roberts, 2000).
The emotional responses that characterize fandom include changes in mood
and affect (Flirt, Zilman, Erickson, & Kennedy, 1992). Following team successes and
failures, sports fans report changes in post game affect, proportional to their level o f
identification and dependent upon their motivation (Wann, Royalty, & Rochelle,
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2002). Individuals who report that their sport fan motivation reflects economic
incentives and eustress account for a large portion o f the variance in positive post
game affect, beyond that which is reported for identification level. However,
identification level remains the single best predictor for post-game affect (Wann,
Royalty, & Rochelle, 2002). Additionally and more specifically, the self-reported
importance o f fandom to the individual as a highly social activity is associated with
intensified affective reactions, both positive and negative (Wann, Friedman, McHale,
& Jaffe, 2003).
Beyond the emotional reactions that are reported following team successes
and failures, the existence o f an attributional bias has been reported (Wann & Dolan,
1994). Those spectators that are highly identified with their preferred team will tend
to demonstrate an internal attribution following team success and an external
attribution following team failure. This attributional bias is present to a much lesser
extent in low affiliation fans. Taken together, this indicates that the tendency to
strongly invoke the attributional bias amongst highly identified fans reflects a stark
difference in the interpretation and judgment o f a team’s performance. This tendency
serves to protect and foster both the individual self-concept and collective self worth
o f the highly affiliated fan (Wann & Dolan, 1994).
The limited physiological research that has been conducted on sports fandom
has been directed towards an understanding o f the emotional responses induced by
sports affiliation and how these responses vary depending on level o f affiliation
(Hillman et al., 2000). Event-related potentials (ERP) and heart rate measures
recorded during the presentation o f team-relevant and team-irrelevant images were
shown to vary as a function o f the level o f fan identification (Hillman et al., 2000).
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Team-relevant images evoke a physiological response interpreted as a motivated
attentional state in highly identified fans. This supports the notion that the arousing
and pleasant interpretation o f the images increases as level o f affiliation approaches
fanaticism (Hillman et al., 2000).
The benefits accrued as a result o f sports fandom must be understood with
respect to the costs o f sports fandom. Self-esteem, affect, mood, and the attributional
bias must also be considered in light o f team losses, failures, and disappointments. A
team loss, within the concept o f social identity theory and identity theory, represents a
direct threat to the global self-concept (End, Dietz-Uhler, Harrick, & Jacquemotte,
2002). An association with an unsuccessful group is internalized and may exact a
change in affect, mood, and self-esteem, comparable to the positive changes
associated with team success outlined above (Jacobson, 2003; Warm, Royalty, &
Rochelle, 2002; Hirt, Zillman, & Erickson, 1992).
In conjunction with a discussion o f the costs o f sports fandom, there is a
certain level o f negativity within the relevant literature that is associated with team
fanaticism. Specifically, levels o f sport-related aggression vary in accordance with
levels o f sports affiliation (Warm, Peterson, Cothran, & Dykes, 1999). As level o f
sports affiliation increases, attitudes toward using war analogies to describe sporting
events become more accepting. N ot only do highly identified sports fan perceive
these analogies as more appropriate than their low affiliation counterparts, they are
more likely to agree that there are underlying similarities between sports and war
(End, Kretschmar, Campbell, & Dietz-Uhler, 2003). Beyond symbolic
acknowledgments o f aggressive tendencies and analogies, explicit acts o f aggression
have been investigated in relation to fandom (Warm, Peterson, Cothran, & Dykes,
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1999; Wann, Hunter, Ryan, & Wright, 2001). While direct engagement in such
actions has not been demonstrated, a tendency or readiness to engage in aggressive
activities, as reported by highly identified fans, has been established. This type o f
willingness to perform anonymous illegal and anti-social actions that would benefit
the team o f preference has been demonstrated using a variety o f scenarios including
such activities as allowing or helping team members to cheat on an exam and bribing
a referee (Wann, Hunter, Ryan, & Wright, 2001). Past research has indicated that
compliance or active participation in the injury o f a rival team player is related to the
level o f team identification (Wann, Peterson, Cothran, & Dykes, 1999). It should be
noted that there is no correlation between sports fandom and general willingness to
perform illegal actions that would not benefit the team. That is to say that level o f
general aggression does not predict sports identification level but rather sports
identification level predicts specific acts o f sports related aggression (Wann, Hunter,
Ryan, & Wright, 2001; Wann, Peterson, Cothran, & Dykes, 1999).
The psychological underpinnings o f high sports affiliation levels and the
associated behaviors and beliefs converge in such a way that serves to differentiate
the casual fan from the fanatic. Such knowledge is important within the realm o f
sports psychology; however, understanding the broader implications as applied to
fanaticism across ideologies has applied significance that transcends the theoretical
importance outlined above. Drawing upon the conceptual link that has been
established between sports fanaticism and that which is directed toward religion,
politics, and nationalism, one is able to begin to formulate a model for understanding
the aggressive behaviors that may characterize fanatical individuals.
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The association o f fanaticism and extreme aggressive or violent behavior is
theorized to be in part a reflection o f the closer than normal link between belief and
action within the mind o f the fanatic. A distinct, and powerful, although often
inconsistent, world view dominates the thought patterns and the actions o f the
individuals. An unyielding disdain for conflicting views coupled with extreme
devotion to a belief system translates from ideology into action. Terrorist acts
therefore, are seen as theoretically rooted in fanaticism (Taylor & Ryan, 1988).
Engaging in aggressive behaviors that are morally questionable and legally
reprehensible often requires a certain level o f deception. From relatively minor
misrepresentations o f intention or belief to the intricacies involved in the planning o f
covert large-scale attacks, deceitful behavior is beneficial and necessary to the
individual and to the group as a whole. Specifically, history suggests that religious
and political fanaticism have relied on treachery and deception in order to carry out
various acts o f aggression designed to foster and promote their ideology (Wadley,
2003). For instance, counterinsurgency efforts have often employed infiltrators to
obtain information about a specific group, false promises o f leniency for surrendering
individuals in wartime situations, and falsification o f identity and intention on the part
o f suicide bombers passing security check points have all been employed (Wadley,
2003).
A very specific and comprehensive example o f the level o f deceit involved in
the execution o f fanatically driven terrorist acts has emerged following the September
11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. A1 Qaeda operatives who
carried out the attacks acted as sleeper agents within the United States, obtained false
documents, and interacted with institutions and agencies under false pretenses
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(Wadley, 2003). The level o f deception required to ensure the successful realization
o f their ultimate goal was deliberate, extensive, and extremely effective.
The importance o f developing effective and accurate techniques to identify
deception and deceptive individuals cannot be understated, in particular, in those
individuals who are likely to carry out violent or aggressive acts. Fanatical
individuals possess a belief structure and support an ideology that is deeply rooted in
their self-concept, self-esteem, affect, mood, attributions, and global outlook and are
more likely to carry out such acts relating to their fanatic belief structure (Warm,
Hunter, Ryan, & Wright, 2001; Warm, Peterson, Cothran, & Dykes, 1999). Will the
intensity and breadth o f their fanatical or ideological commitment impact their ability
to be deceptive? Will they need to work harder, neurologically or physiologically, to
convey a convincing departure from this belief system?
The polygraph machine, which is often employed to this end, has evidenced
inconsistent results and significant limitations (Knight, 2004). Therefore, there is a
strong need for rapid, portable, and simple technology designed to identify deceptive
individuals who are planning or executing terrorist acts (Pavlidis, Eberhardt, &
Levine, 2002). The measurement o f motor evoked potentials following the
administration o f transcranial magnetic stimulation to the motor cortex during
deceptive statements or responses may be a useful tool in such an evaluation. The
current study seeks to evaluate the differential activation and hemispheric differences
caused by the generation o f truthfiil and deceptive responses. More importantly,
however, to identify the differential activation caused by truthful and deceptive
responses between high affiliation, or fanatical individuals, and low affiliation
individuals. In the most extreme case, using a model o f sports fanaticism and
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deception to approach and understand acts o f terrorism motivated by such fanaticism
may aid in the future prevention o f such acts.
Method

Participants
Ten undergraduate males (ages 18-24) participated in exchange for $25
compensation. Six highly identified baseball fans (two Yankee and four Red Sox) and
four low affiliation baseball fans (two Yankee and two Red Sox) were recruited using
flyer advertisements and referrals.

Materials
All data were collected by and images were presented on Dell computers with
Pentium III processors running Acqknowledge 3.7.1 (MNL, St. Louis, MO, USA)
and Superlab 2.0 (Cedrus Corporation, San Pedro, CA, USA), respectively. A 19-inch
Dell monitor was used for the stimuli presentation. Additionally, a chinrest was used
to ensure equivalent viewing distance across participants. All photographs o f team
relevant images were downloaded from the Internet, paired based on approximate
content, and size standardized to conform to 2” x 2” measurement.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation was administered using a TMS-Magstim
200 MonoPulse machine with a figure 8 coil set to motor threshold for each
individual. A Biopac Systems MP150 analog amplifier, filtering at a pre-acquisition
rate o f 1 Hz and 500Hz, was used to acquire data at 100 ms intervals at 500 Hz. Three
electrodes were used to measure motor evoked potentials (one abductor muscle o f the
thumb, one on the outside line o f the thumb, and one ground placed on the back o f the
hand and approaching the wrist).
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The handedness survey, Sports Spectator Identification Scale (SSIS),
Psychological Commitment to Team (PCT), and Sports Fan Motivation Scale
(SFMS) were administered to each participant prior to enrollment in the study. The
SSIS and PCT were modified to reflect the specified team allegiance, either Yankee
or Red Sox. In addition, the SSIS was modified to reflect Major League Soccer
(MLS) affiliation to ensure that control conditions were satisfied in that participants
were not strongly identified soccer fans. Cumulative scores on the SSIS were used to
distinguish between high and low affiliation fans with those scoring above and below
the median, respectively.

Design and Procedure
Following the successful location o f the motor cortex and motor threshold,
participants were provided with written and oral instructions that were formulated
according to their team affiliation. In the truthful condition, participants were
instructed to respond honestly. In the lying condition, participants were instructed to
pretend to be fans o f the opposing team (see Appendix A). Six practice trials were
presented (three lying and 3 truthful). Following the participant’s deceptive response,
instructions appeared advising them that their response was being calculated and
analyzed. After 30 seconds, a graph appeared on the screen and participants were
informed that the results indicated that they needed to try harder to fool the machine
by truly pretending to be a fan o f the opposing team while responding.
Each block began with the instruction to tell the truth or to he. Each trial
began with a fixation point at the center o f the screen. Following fixation, one image
appeared at the top o f the screen and its matched pair appeared at the bottom o f the
screen as shown in Figure 1.
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Yankee - Neutral Stimuli

Red Sox - Neutral Stimuli

Red Sox - Yankee Stimuli

Figure 1. Sample stimuli including neutral (MLS), Red Sox, and Yankee images
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TMS pulses were delivered during the presentation o f the stimuli at variable
intervals o f 50 ms, 100 ms, and 150 ms. Images remained on screen for 200 ms.
Following the presentation o f images, the participants were prompted to identify the
image that represented their preferred team by indicating either “top” or “bottom”. A
reminder o f truth or lie condition was presented halfway through the block. I SI
between response and presentation o f the next stimuli was 300ms. Four blocks o f 36
trials each were presented. Presentation o f stimuli pair within each block was
randomized. Block presentations and order o f hemispheric motor cortex testing was
counterbalanced.
Results
Scores on the Sport Spectator Identification Scale (SSIS) served as the
primary indicator o f fan affiliation level (see Appendix B). Scores were summed
according to the participant’s responses and were divided into low and high affiliation
categories based on a midpoint score. Those scoring above the midpoint were
considered high affiliation while those scoring below the midpoint were considered
low affiliation, regardless o f team preference. Six participants scored in the high
affiliation range and four participants scored in the low affiliation range. All high
affiliation fans responded to the question o f their dislike o f the rival team by
indicating a seven or eight, representing an intense dislike. This justified the inclusion
o f the rival team images and the assumption that a definite and strong dislike o f the
rival team accompanied all high affiliation responses. Scores from the remaining
scales will be maintained for future analysis relating to differences between
motivation and fandom.
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MEP data was filtered using a Finite Impulse Response (FIR) linear Bandpass
filter at 60 Hz and 125 Hz and rectified using an absolute value conversion. Complete
waveforms were visually inspected for TMS onset, pulse duration, latency o f MEP,
and termination o f MEP. Each trial was trimmed to exclude the first 24ms and last
40ms as it was determined that this reflected the most complete MEP across all
subjects and conditions (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. MEP data for all participants across al trials.
Following data transformation as described above, three ANOVAs were
performed to determine differences reflected in the average area under the curve
(AUC), peak amplitude, and variability o f the MEP data. Three variables were
considered. Hemisphere (Right, Left) and Condition (True, Lie) were included as
within-subjects factors. Affiliation (High, Low) was included as the between-subjects
factor.
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A significant main effect was narrowly missed for hemisphere when analyzing
AUC, F (l,l)= 5.15, p<.053. Specifically, right hemisphere activation during truths
(M= 168) and lies (M= 154) tended to be less than left hemisphere activation during
truths (M=.179) and lies (M= 198). (see Figure 3). A similar trend, as shown in
Figure 4, emerged for the variability o f the MEPs analyzed using a 2x2x2 ANOVA.
An additional main effect for hemisphere was found, indicating that the left
hemisphere, though exhibiting a larger MEP response, showed more variability than
the right hemisphere across both conditions, though tending towards a larger effect
during the deceptive condition (M=.267 and M=.228, respectively) F(l,l)=5.706,
p<.044.
In addition, a main effect for affiliation was found with high affiliation
(M=.128) participants evidencing significantly less activation than their low
affiliation (M=.221) counterparts as reflected in AUC, F (l,l)= 6.36, p<.036) (see
Figure 5). The significant main effect o f affiliation was further reinforced. While, as
stated above, low affiliation (M=.313) participants showed greater activation, the
variability o f their MEP response was greater than the high affiliation (M=.180)
participants, F (l,l)= 6.11, p<.039) (see Figure 6).
No significant interactions or main effects emerged for the peak MEP, save
the main effect o f affiliation, as found with AUC and variability. High affiliation
(M =l .337) participants showed significantly less activation than low affiliation
(M=2.397) participants, F(1,1)=8.65, p<.019) (see figure 7).
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Figure 3. Area under the curve as a function o f hemisphere and condition (true vs.
lie) while accounting for level o f affiliation.

Figure 4. Variability as a function o f hemisphere and condition (true vs. lie) while
accounting for level o f affiliation.
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Figure 5. MEP value as reflected in Area under the curve as a function o f high (H)
and low (L) affiliation.

Figure 6. MEP value as reflected in variability as a function o f high (H) and low (L)
affiliation.
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Figure 7. MEP value as reflected in peak amplitude as a function o f high (H) and low
(L) affiliation.
Discussion
The main findings include a significant effect for hemisphere. Overall, the left
hemisphere evidenced more activation and more variability o f activation across the
deceptive and truthful tasks. Further, low affiliation fans displayed higher activation
levels and higher variability o f response across both tasks. These findings are
somewhat surprising in light o f the evidence and theories outlined above.
The significance o f the obtained results requires further explication within the
confines o f the theoretical basis o f deception and the specific procedures
implemented. In general, greater left hemisphere activation was seen during
deception. This activation, however, was more variable. The right hemisphere, while
less activated during deception displayed greater consistency over time. The crux o f
the issue then becomes the theoretical relationship between activation level and
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variability as observed during the administration o f TMS and as a reflection o f the
difficulty or ease with which each hemisphere is able to generate deceptive responses.
The combined significance o f level o f activation and variability o f response is
o f utmost importance and most accurately reflects the nature o f the current data.
Increased activation and increased variability can be interpreted as a reflection o f the
difficulty that the hemisphere is experiencing in performing the task. In essence, to
generate a deceptive response, the left hemisphere must work harder. Further, the
inconsistent nature o f the response can be interpreted as a reflection o f the
hemisphere’s lack o f adeptness with the given task. Therefore, the right hemisphere’s
consistent, lower level activation can serve as a reflection o f the underlying
proficiency and ease with which the task is accomplished.
The possible explanation outlined above is suggested by the data but not
confirmed. The interpretation o f variability o f response is not clearly defined. It is
possible that the increased variability observed is simply a statistical artifact resulting
from the larger values measured during left hemisphere activation. It is possible that
the variability obtained was a function o f the coil placement or task specific demands.
It is possible that the greater left hemisphere activation stands in contrast to the
findings concerning preferential right hemisphere activation during deception. In spite
o f these possibilities, it remains plausible that decreased variability is a reflection o f
increased proficiency, however, such a statement cannot be explicitly confirmed.
Further, there are a number o f possible alternative explanations to account for
the observed increase in left hemisphere activation in conjunction with the greater
variability o f left hemisphere response. There is some related evidence to support the
notion o f increased left hemisphere activation during deception. This is an important
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component o f the present study and necessitates a more complete analysis. The
finding o f left hemisphere activation replicates a small number o f previous studies
relating to self-awareness and theory o f mind. For example, PET studies analyzing
the processes o f applying TOM to other’s actions reported primarily left hemisphere
activation (Calarge, Andreason, & O’Leary, 2003). A number o f other studies have
indicated some left hemisphere involvement, although right hemisphere activation
was considered more definitive (Kozel, Padgett, & George, 2004; Spence et al.,
2001). If the theoretical connection between the right hemisphere, self-awareness,
TOM, and deception is maintained (Keenan, Gallup, & Falk, 2003), the left
hemisphere activation observed in the current study must be revisited. Therefore, the
present results must be further considered within the context o f the caveats specific to
TMS studies and the present study in particular.
There is some evidence to suggest that the left motor cortex, in general,
produces a greater response in tasks such as the one implemented by the current study
as a function o f greater activation o f the left motor cortex in general. Interpretation o f
results can become difficult under such circumstances. If this is the case, variability
o f response, instead o f peak amplitude or area under the curve, may be a more
accurate indicator o f hemispheric differences. As discussed above, the argument can
be made that while the left hemisphere is more activated, the right hemisphere’s
consistent activation is, in fact, more telling. A number o f studies involving EEG
have relied, in part, on the consistency o f the data recorded. The application o f this
notion to the use o f TMS may be fruitful.
Finally, a large number o f the stimuli that were included in the study
contained words. Team names and player names, for example, frequently appeared on
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the images containing jerseys, collectibles, and memorabilia. It remains possible that
in order to determine if the stimuli were Yankee, Red Sox, or neutral images, the
participants were actively reading the information contained in the photographs.
Further, when stimuli were instantly recognized and categorized by the individual, it
is still possible that the words were read as further confirmation or as an incidental
occurrence that could not be avoided. There is evidence to suggest that, while
reading, increased activation in the motor cortex o f the language dominant
hemisphere takes place (Meister, Boroojerdi, & Foltys, 2003). It is difficult to find
sporting images that do not contain letters or numbers, as these are crucial identifiers
used to distinguish teams and individual players. Modifying the task to remove this
potential confound may alter the reliance on or over activation o f the left hemisphere.
This would, however, require individuals to be overly familiar with the stimuli in
order to determine team identity, absent o f such markers and would, therefore, be
quite challenging for low affiliation participants.
It is unlikely that this possibility will directly impact the comparison between
truthful and deceptive tasks. As the activation observed in both conditions did not
reliably differ within either hemisphere, the semantic implications outlined above are
limited to the comparison between hemispheres. This, therefore, does not account for
the lack o f increased activation that was predicted during deception but rather seeks
to provide a plausible explanation for the surprising increase in left hemisphere
activation during both tasks.
Overall, low affiliation participants showed greater MEP, reflecting increased
activation during their responses, both truthful and deceptive. Additionally, low
affiliation participants showed greater variance in MEP response. High affiliation
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participants, who were less activated, delivered more consistent results. These
findings are quite surprising and certainly necessitate an explanation o f the possible
reasons for such a counterintuitive result.
Perhaps the most salient argument in defense o f the finding that low affiliation
participants evidence greater activation while performing the tasks relates to the
notion o f novelty. It can be concluded, based on responses supplied in the SSIS, that
high affiliation fans are more familiar with team related images. Questions directly
addressing this issue include how often games are watched and/or followed in the
news and how often the insignia or group paraphernalia is displayed by the
individual. It follows therefore, that familiarity with the images is significantly higher
amongst high affiliation fans. Low affiliation fans, who do not regularly engage in the
above listed activities, as reported in their SSIS scores, are likely not as familiar with
the specific images displayed during the presentation o f the stimuli or team specific
images in general. The act o f viewing these novel stimuli may have contributed to the
increased activation shown by low affiliation fans in both the deceptive and truthful
conditions and across hemispheres.
An extension o f this notion pertains to task difficulty. As a function o f the
unfamiliarity with the stimuli, the decisional process is made more difficult for low
affiliation fans. In order to determine the correct answer, either truth or lie, the
participant must determine what the images represent. If the images are not familiar,
more searching and analysis o f the pictures will be required to make this
determination, and therefore, more activation may be evidenced in the form o f greater
MEP response.
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All participants provided correct answers in both the truthful and deceptive
conditions. While the images were novel to some, they could be identified
sufficiently, such that the participant was able to provide the correct response.
However, as reaction time was not measured, it is not possible to determine the speed
with which low and high affiliation participants responded. Future research should
include a measure o f reaction time so that task difficulty can be further clarified as a
function o f the time needed to process the decisions and respond accurately.
The notion that high affiliation fans require less activation to provide
deceptive and truthful answers is intriguing. A theoretical reversal, similar to the
concept o f hemispheric proficiency as reflected in variability and activation level,
may be required in order to understand this seeming contradiction. High affiliation
individuals maintain a strong conviction in their beliefs and a clear and definitive
understanding o f their level o f commitment (Warm & Royalty, 2000). It may be
possible that because o f the conviction associated with high affiliation, responses
relating to the affiliation are not difficult to generate, and therefore, do not require as
much activation as those individuals who are less convinced o f their affiliation and
commitment level. In keeping with the argument outlined above, therefore, low
affiliation individuals require more activation to generate either a deceptive or a
truthful response. It remains difficult to determine the likelihood o f such an argument,
however. At this point, in the absence o f sufficient corroborative data, the issue is
primarily philosophical.
It may be argued that the obtained results are, in actuality, simply a reflection
o f the emotional import o f the images. It is important to recognize that there is an
emotional component to the task that may in fact be, in part, responsible for the
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increased activation. The negativity associated with rival teams and the positive
emotional attachment that high affiliation fans exhibit towards their preferred team
contributes to the psychological salience o f the task. However, because the low
affiliation fans exhibited greater MEP response, it is unlikely that activation can be
interpreted as emotionally driven. As indicated by their SSIS scores, low affiliation
fans are less identified with their team o f preference, less committed to, and less
likely to view their fandom as important and are therefore, less emotionally invested.
In spite o f the outcome, there are limitations with the present study that must
be discussed. Low and high affiliation group membership was determined based on
cumulative scores on the SSIS. The categorization o f high and low affiliation was
based on a cutoff point determined as the mean cumulative score. In addition, a
number o f low affiliation fans reported a more intense dislike o f their preferred
team’s greatest rival. Some individuals who identify as low affiliation fans may
possess an intense dislike o f the opposing team, which may be understood as a high
affiliation association in the sense that the extent o f their dislike may be equivalent to
the extent o f support evidenced by high affiliation fans. While there is an existing
body o f literature relating to high affiliation fans and their relationship with rival
teams (Wann & Dolan, 2001; Warm, Hunter, Ryan, & Leigh, 2001; Warm, Peterson,
Cothran, & Dykes, 1999), there is an absence o f information relating to low
affiliation, casual fans who exhibit intense dislike for opposing teams. The current
study did not differentiate these sufficiently to determine if there are categories other
than high and low affiliation. Therefore, replication o f the results with individuals
representing a more natural dichotomy o f beliefs is necessary. Increased sample size
is another desirable component o f future replication studies.
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As stated, an attempt was made to encourage the participants to actively focus
on the deceptive condition by displaying a fictional, sample output o f their results.
Based on this graphic output, each participant was asked to try harder and told that it
was important that their responses were effortfifi. However, it is difficult to ensure
that participants were sufficiently motivated. The repetitive nature o f the stimuli
presentation lends itself to practice effects. It is possible that responses became
automatic and the genuine effort to deceive the machine was not maintained
throughout the session.
Future research should attempt to expand the results obtained to individuals
possessing fanatical beliefs directed towards religious and political institutions. In
general, if it can be established that such activation is present across fanatical
individuals and ideologies, the applied significance will be increased and fortified.
Additionally, incentive should be further investigated. Situations in which individuals
with fanatical beliefs engage in deception are often characterized as high stakes,
requiring interpersonal communication and active deception. Convincing others o f
highly conflicting false beliefs involves subtleties o f verbal and nonverbal
communication. Using a similar technique during tasks which require the deception
o f another individual would require active engagement in the deceit, assuming the
presence o f a significant motivator. Combining these techniques would likely
enhance the effect size and generalizability o f the results.
The current research is supportive o f the utility o f TMS with respect to
deception research, as hemispheric differences were evidenced. Beyond this,
however, the utility o f TMS in the applied setting requires further investigation.
Following the extension o f sports fanaticism to other forms o f fanaticism, it remains
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to be seen whether or not TMS can be successfully implemented in a high stakes
deceptive situation.
In conclusion, the notion that fanatical and low affiliation individuals engage
in deception differently, both behaviorally and neurologically, lends itself to a more
complex and thorough investigation. Therefore, although the results obtained differ
from those obtained in previous deception studies, they provide a starting point for
future research that may contribute to a deeper theoretical understanding o f
fanaticism and an applied significance within law enforcement procedures.
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Appendix A
Instructions
During the experiment you will view a series o f sports related pictures. The pictures
will appear in pairs on the computer screen and will represent the Yankees, the Red
Sox, or a variety o f Major League Soccer teams. If you do not recognize the image,
for example, if you see a team logo or a team player in a uniform that is unfamiliar, it
is likely a Major League Soccer picture.

There are 4 blocks during the experiment. At the start o f each block you will be
instructed to tell a LIE or to tell the TRUTH. Following these instructions, a fixation
point will appear in the middle o f the screen. Keep your eye trained on this point. 2
pictures will appear, 1 at the top o f the screen and 1 at the bottom. When the pictures
are removed, you will be asked, Which image represents your preferred team? Wait
until you are prompted with this question before verbally responding TOP or
BOTTOM.

As a Yankee fan, if you are asked to lie, please choose the Red Sox picture as your
preferred team. If a Red Sox picture is not displayed, please choose the Major
League Soccer team as your preferred team.
When asked to tell the truth, please choose the Yankee picture as your preferred team.
If a Yankee picture is not displayed, you must choose between the Red Sox and
Major League Soccer team. You may choose the MLS team even if you are not
familiar with the team.
In the middle o f each block you will be reminded to LIE or tell the TRUTH.
You will be given a demonstration and practice session before the start o f the
experiment.
Thank you for your participation.
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Appendix B
Sports Spectator Identification Scale
How important to YOU is it that your favorite Major League Baseball (MLB) team
wins? (Not Important/Very Important)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

How strongly do YOU see YOURSELF as a fan o f your favorite MLB team? (Not At
All a Fan/Very Much a Fan)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

How strongly do your FRIENDS see YOU as a fan o f your favorite MLB team? (Not
At All a Fan/Very Much a Fan)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

During the season, how closely do you follow your favorite MLB team via any o f the
following: a) in person or on television, b) on the radio, c) television news or a
newspaper? (Never/Almost Every Day)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

How important is being a fan o f your favorite MLB team to YOU? (Not Important/Very
Important)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

How much do YOU dislike your favorite MLB team’s greatest rivals? (Do Not
Dislike/Dislike Very Much)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

How often do YOU display your favorite MLB team’s name or insignia at your place
o f work, where you five, or on your clothing? (Never/Always)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

